AbstractConcurrent delays are multiple project participants incurring delays on parallel schedule paths. They have been controversial because it is challenging to apportion liability for liquidated damages fairly and equitably. To date, there exist neither a transparent solution, nor one that addresses all possible scenarios, including mixed, where some participants are ahead of schedule and others are behind. This study therefore proposes a comprehensive model that also newly includes incentive bonuses. This cooperative game theory–based approach has three steps: (1) identify as-planned and as-built schedule inputs; (2) categorize delayed and ahead activities; and (3) operate games to determine Shapley values. Compared with prior delay analysis methods, our model is more robust and apportions liability not just in days, but also in financial terms. A real-world case was analyzed to validate it and demonstrate the reasonableness of its results. This study contributes to the body of knowledge by creating an objective concurrent delay analysis using readily available project data. It also aids in incentivizing project participants to deliver their best possible performance.